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Abstract—Deep Neural Networks(DNN) have excessively ad-
vanced the field of computer vision by achieving state of the
art performance in various vision tasks. These results are
not limited to the field of vision but can also be seen in
speech recognition and machine translation tasks. Recently,
DNNs are found to poorly fail when tested with samples that
are crafted by making imperceptible changes to the original
input images. This causes a gap between the validation and
adversarial performance of a DNN. An effective and generalizable
robustness metric for evaluating the performance of DNN on
these adversarial inputs is still missing from the literature. In
this paper, we propose Noise Sensitivity Score (NSS), a metric
that quantifies the performance of a DNN on a specific input
under different forms of fix-directional attacks. An insightful
mathematical explanation is provided for deeply understanding
the proposed metric. By leveraging the NSS, we also proposed
a skewness based dataset robustness metric for evaluating a
DNN’s adversarial performance on a given dataset. Extensive
experiments using widely used state of the art architectures along
with popular classification datasets, such as MNIST, CIFAR-10,
CIFAR-100, and ImageNet, are used to validate the effectiveness
and generalization of our proposed metrics. Instead of simply
measuring a DNN’s adversarial robustness in the input domain,
as previous works, the proposed NSS is built on top of insightful
mathematical understanding of the adversarial attack and gives
a more explicit explanation of the robustness.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, machine learning and in particular deep
learning has impacted various different fields, such as com-
puter vision, natural language processing, and sentiment anal-
ysis. We have witnessed algorithms achieving human-like
performance on a number of highly competitive datasets.
The advent of deep learning has revolutionized the field of
computer vision. The one interesting observation through all
these results is the difference between machine and human
vision. This difference is becoming more prominent after
robustness flaws were found in neural network architectures
[1]. Despite their outstanding performances, these algorithms
tend to blow up when tested with adversarial inputs: perturbed
inputs to force an algorithm to provide adversary-selected
outputs. Adversarial machine learning is a branch of research
∗Authors colloborated equally and are ordered by their last names.
1Codes for the proposed metric and experiments, for further research
and development, will be available upon acceptance.
that lies between machine learning and computer security. The
vulnerability of deep networks to adversarial inputs is getting
significant attention as they are used in various security and
human safety applications. In general, an adversarial sample
is generated by minimal perturbations of input data that are
imperceptible to a human observer. More importantly, these
adversaries are shown to be transferable between different
architectures [2]. Exploring this transferability property, it
was observed that adversaries can be created using black-
box attacks by training an unknown architecture on similar
data [3]. Besides black-box attacks, there are many other
adversarial attack schemes. These schemes can be divided into
two categories, namely fix-directional and unfix-directional
attack. The direction in the context of adversarial attack
means the direction of the generated adversarial vector used
for perturbing a specific input, which means the direction is
input-wise. During an adversarial attack, if the direction of
the generated vector keeps unchanged, it falls into the fix-
directional attack, and vice-versa. In this paper, we mainly
focus on fix-directional attacks.
One would expect state-of-the-art architectures to be robust
in these adversarial environments, but our experimental results
do not confirm that. For example, the pre-trained DenseNet-
161 from PyTorch [4] gives fairly high top-1 validation ac-
curacy 77.14% on ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition
Challenge (ILSVR) 2012 dataset. Surprisingly, it falls to
35.2% under a Fast Gradient Sign Method attack with an
allowable noise level up to µ = 0.00117(0.3/256). With
an increase in noise level, the validation accuracy decreases
further. When the allowable noise level increases up to µ =
0.00293(0.75/256), the validation accuracy of DenseNet-161
is only 15.19%. In Fig. 1, five original and misclassification
adversarial images are illustrated. The adversarial images are
obtained from a FGSM attack to the DenseNet-161. As shown
in Fig. 1, there is no noticeable perceptual difference among
the first four image pairs (e.g., Fig. 1a vs Fig. 1f) which makes
the adversarial attacks significantly dangerous. This is mainly
because the allowable noise level is controlled in a low value
range (i.e., up to µ = 0.00293). We can also give a very high
allowable noise level, say µ = 0.39063(100/256), as shown in
Fig. 1e and Fig. 1j in order to observe the noticeable noise in
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(a) GT: Tench (b) GT: Water ouzel (c) GT:Black swan (d) GT: Wheaten terrier (e) GT: Honeycomb
(f) MC: Coho
µ = 0.00117,  = 0.0007
(g) MC: Partridge
µ = 0.00156,  = 0.0015
(h) MC: European gallinule
µ = 0.00195,  = 0.0017
(i) MC: Irish terrier
µ = 0.00293,  = 0.0022
(j) MC:chainlink fence
µ = 0.39063,  = 0.1482
Fig. 1: An illustration of the effect of FGSM attack on a pre-trained DenseNet-161 model. The images from (a)-(e) are the original images
with their respective Ground Truth (GT) labels, and (f)-(j) are the crafted adversarial images along with their respective Mis-Classified (MC)
labels. The corresponding maximum allowable noise level (µ) and the used noise level () used by the FGSM are also indicated.
the adversarial image. Thus, an ideal adversarial attack needs
to control the allowable noise level in order not to bring any
noticeable perceptual difference.
Therefore, an extensive adversarial performance evaluation
is needed for all DNNs that are to be used for real-world
applications. Relying solely on classification accuracies is not
sufficient to define the robustness of an architecture. Even
though many adversarial robustness metrics are proposed, most
of them are only validated on either very limited small datasets
(e.g., MNIST and CIFAR-10) or with very limited DNN
models, which makes the proposed metrics unconvincing, es-
pecially in terms of the metrics’ scalability [5]–[8]. A scalable
and more convincing robustness metric is still missing from the
literature and we aim to bridge this gap using our proposed
work. In this paper, a novel Noise Sensitivity Score (NSS)
metric is proposed, which is able to quantize the adversarial
robustness of a DNN’s input under a fix-directional adversarial
attack. We model fix-directional adversarial attacks mathemat-
ically and provide an intuitive explanation about why and how
does the proposed NSS work, which is also missed by most of
the previous works. Based on the proposed NSS, a skewness
based dataset robustness metric is also proposed to evaluate
a DNN’s adversarial performance on a specific dataset. More
importantly, the proposed NSS and skewness based dataset
robustness metric are extensively tested with different state-of-
the-art DNN models (e.g., DenseNet-161, ResNet-152) across
different widely used classification datasets (i.e., MNIST,
CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, ImageNet), which gives a potential
user more confidence to trust the proposed metrics. This paper
makes the following contributions:
• We intuitively and mathematically explain a DNN’s fix-
directional adversarial attack and propose NSS and skew-
ness based dataset robustness metric on top of it. The
expandability of the proposed metrics are vital in the
DNN society.
• We present a diverse set of experimental results, and
show that a) our proposed robustness metrics are effective
and generalizable on different DNNs, datasets, and attack
types. b) the skewness based dataset robustness metric
provides a more intuitive understanding than adversarial
accuracy.
This paper is organized as follows. We summarize the
background to our paper in Section II. In Section III, we
elaborate on the proposed robustness metric score by providing
an extensive explanation to understand it’s role in adversarial
performance. Results from comparative experiments for dif-
ferent architectures and datasets are given in Section IV. We
then discuss various insights that we gained from our current
work in section V. We provide a brief summary of the related
works in section VI. Conclusions are finally drawn in Section
VII.
II. BACKGROUND
Adversaries in neural networks have become an area of
active research after experiments showed that neural networks
are prone to attacks from adversaries [1]. Additionally, the use
of neural networks in critical applications, such as security,
surveillance systems, and medical imaging, requires a high
degree of robustness from these models. With regards to
adversaries in deep learning, research is simultaneously done
in three directions. First, given an input distribution, craft-
ing adversarial samples using novel adversarial algorithms.
Second, proposing methods to develop defenses against these
adversaries, and last, introducing metrics for measuring the
robustness of a DNN.
A. Adversarial Attacks
Over the past few years, extensive work has been done
in devising new methods to generate adversarial samples.
Broadly, adversarial attacks can be divided into gradient based
attacks, non-gradient based attacks and black-box attacks.
Gradient attacks are further sub-divided into fix-directional and
unfix-directional attacks. Fix-directional gradient attacks have
been extensively used in the literature [3], [9]. Szegedy et al.
[1] proposed L-BFGS algorithm to craft adversarial samples
and showed that these samples possess transferability prop-
erty. Goodfellow et al. proposed Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) - a fast approach for generating adversarial samples
by adding perturbation proportional to the sign of the cost
functions gradient [10]. FGSM as defined, moves one in the
direction (fixed) of the border between the true class and some
other class. Rather than adding perturbation throughout the
image, Pappernot el al. [5] proposed Jacobian Saliency Map
Approach (JSMA) - the notion of adversarial saliency maps
in which only the most sensitive input components were only
perturbed.
Kurakin et al. proposed Iterative Gradient Sign Method
(IGSM) as a simple extension to FGSM [11]. Instead of
applying the adversarial noise once, the method applies it
iteratively with smaller noises. Additionally, in each iterative
step the direction of the attack could change leading to a unfix-
directional attack. Evidently, IGSM is cost ineffective as com-
pared to FGSM attack [9]. DeepFool computed and applied
the minimal perturbation necessary for misclassification under
the L2-norm [12]. In this approach, the algorithm performs
iterative steps in the adversarial direction of the gradient
provided by a local linear approximation of the classifier.
As a result, the approximation is more accurate than FGSM
and faster than JSMA, as all the pixels are simultaneously
modified at each step of the method. As an extension of this
work, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. crafted an universal perturbation
indifferently applicable to any instance [13]. The perturbation
is computed in a greedy fashion and needs multiple iterations
for convergence. Carlini et al. proposed an efficient method
to compute good approximations while keeping the compu-
tational cost of perturbing examples low [8]. It defined three
similar targeted attacks, based on different distortion measures:
L0, L2, and L∞ respectively.
It is to be noted that all the above mentioned attacks falls
under the general category of gradient attacks. In the classical
black-box attack, the adversarial algorithm has no knowledge
of the architectural choices made to design the original archi-
tecture, which includes the number, type, and size of layers,
nor of the training data used to learn the architectural hyper-
parameters. The algorithm’s only capability is to observe the
labels assigned by the network for chosen inputs [3]. There
are different ways to generate adversarial samples using black-
box schemes. Detailing all of them is outside the scope of this
paper.
B. Adversarial Defenses
Notably, it is difficult to find new methods that are ef-
fective in threatening a model, and even tougher to defend
an algorithm from it. There have been some suggestions
in the literature to design defensive mechanisms for deep
learning architectures. Goodfellow et al. proposed adversarial
training in which an algorithm is retrained with adversarial
images alongside the legitimate dataset [10] . Pappernot et al.
extended defensive distillation—which is one of the mecha-
nisms proposed to mitigate adversarial examples—to address
its limitations [14]. They revisited the defensive distillation
approach and used soft labels to train the distilled model.
The resultant model was robust to attacks, such as FGSM and
JSMA. Liang et al. proposed a method where the perturbation
to the input images are regarded as a kind of noise and the
noise reduction techniques are used to reduce the adversarial
effect [15]. Classical image processing operations, such as
scalar quantization and smoothing spatial filters were used
to reduce the effect of perturbations. Bhagoji et al. proposed
dimensionality reduction as a defense against evasion attacks
on different machine learning classifiers [16]. All the above
mentioned works propose defensive mechanisms for a par-
ticular attack type. Clearly, scheming robust models against
adversarial samples remains an open problem.
C. Robustness Metrics
With the development of several adversarial attacks and de-
fenses, there is a need for a robustness metric which quantifies
the performance of a DNN against adversarial samples. Anal-
ogously, little work has been done in devising these metrics.
Most works use adversarial accuracy, performance of a model
in classifying generated adversarial samples, as the metric for
determining the robustness of a model. Arguably, adversarial
accuracies provides very little information concerning the
amount of perturbation needed for attacking the network.
Pedro et al. used the fraction of images (in %) that keep or
switch labels when noise is added to a departing image [6].
This was used as a stability measure for the departing image in
the pixel space of a classifier. This fraction was calculated over
a sample of 100 probes, where each probe was a repetition of
the experiment with all the factors held fixed but the sampling
of the random noise. It is not efficient to use adversarial
accuracy as a measure of robustness as they do not shed light
on the general adversarial behavior of an algorithm at higher
noises. Goodfellow et al. proposed adversarial training to
improve the robustness of a neural network (f ) by augmenting
the training examples with the generated adversarial examples,
and then train a new neural network (f ′) [10]. Robustness
is then evaluated by using the same adversarial algorithm to
generate adversarial samples for f ′. If the algorithm detects
fewer adversarial samples, then f ′ is concluded to be more
robust than f . Adversarial training, in general, increases the
adversarial performance of an algorithm. Measuring robustness
in this way is unproductive, as the overall robustness is directly
proportional to the adversarial images used for retraining
the network. We expect a higher robustness if we generate
adversarial images with varying noises. Moreover, this metric
is more data driven as the network may overfit to the adver-
sarial samples. Various distance measures have been proposed
to quantify the amount of perturbation added in generating
adversarial samples. For instance, L0 distance measured the
number of pixels that have been altered in an image. This
is easily arguable as the distance only counts the number
of altered pixels and does not provide any knowledge with
regards to the measure of perturbation. L2 distance measures
the standard root-mean-square distance between an image and
its adversarial counterpart. It has been found that very small
amount of perturbation is sufficient to generate adversarial
samples. Evidently, the L2 distance can remain very small even
when many small changes are made throughout the image.
Recently, L∞ has been argued as the optimal robustness metric
[17], measuring the maximum change to any of the pixels.
These metrics are not validated for different attacks and archi-
tectures. Using point-wise robustness, Bastani et al. proposed
two statistics, namely adversarial frequency and adversarial
severity, for measuring robustness [7]. For efficiency purposes,
the authors fixed the adversarial label to be the second most
probable label for all the adversarial samples. One would
expect that the adversarial sample for an image X can be
easily created using it’s second most probable class. This
assumption is more intuitional than practical, as many times
the most efficient gradient direction is not in the direction
of the label with second highest score. Also, the proposed
adversarial severity metric does not work with signed gradient
algorithm since all the adversarial examples it finds using L∞
had norm equal to the introduced noise level, . Pappernot
et al. defined the robustness of a DNN as its capability to
resist perturbations [18]. The intuition behind this metric is
that a robust algorithm will ensure that its classification output
will remain constant in a closed neighborhood for any sample
taken from its input distribution. The larger this neighborhood
is for all input samples, the more robust is the DNN. This
approach only tests individual data points from an infinite
input space and certainly does not carry forward to all other
points. Also, the neighborhood value is different for each input
points. One may always observe some input points closer to
the classification boundary having a very small neighborhood
as compared to the one further from it. To sum up, we believe a
good robustness metric is vital in understanding the adversarial
performance of a DNN.
III. APPROACH
A. Background
Deep Neural Network Adversarial Attack A Deep Neural
Network (DNN) D : X → Y can be regarded as an approxi-
mation of a differentiable non-linear function F : X → Y ′
which takes a vector X ∈ RN as input and generates an
output vector Y ∈ RK , where Y is expected to be a close
approximation of Y ′. For each element of the output vector
yi ∈ Y , D(X) defines an unique output surface mi for the
input domain X . When D(X) approximates a loss function
F (X) of a classifier, a single point yi on a output surface
mi represents an error value. Specifically, for an input X , we
have:
D(X) = t
min(yi) = yt i ∈ 1 . . .K, (1)
where t is the predicted class label. A DNN misclassification
adversarial attack with an input X can be defined as:
argmin
δx
‖δx‖ s.t. D(X + δx) 6= D(X), (2)
where ‖ · ‖ is a appropriate norm metric in the input domain
(L2 norm is used in our experiments), and δx is the smallest
perturbations of X used for satisfying the constraint of Eq. (2).
Intuitively, Eq. (2) means that the smallest perturbation δx
moves the original point yi to a new position y′i on the
output surface mi which disqualifies Eq. (1). Many attack
approaches [10]–[12] have been proposed to find the most ef-
fective δx efficiently. In this paper, we focus on fix-directional
adversarial attack methods in which the δx is defined as:
δx = ~V , (3)
where ~V is a generated adversarial vector. FGSM is one of
the fix-directional attacks, where δx is defined as:
δx = ~VFGSM = sign
∂yt
∂X
. (4)
Specifically, as shown in Eq. (4), ~VFGSM is the gradient vector
generated by backpropagating the error yt with respect to
the input X . In order to obtain the most effective δx, a fix-
direction attack only changes the value of  (i.e., noise level)
while keeping the ~V fixed. Contrastively, Iterative Gradient
Sign Method (IGSM) [11] is not a fix-directional attack. It is
because, in each iterative step, the direction of the gradient
vector could be changed.
Data Jacobian Matrix We denote the Data Jacobian Matrix
(DJM) of a DNN for an input X as:
DJM(X) =
∂F (X)
∂X
=
[
∂Fi(X)
∂xj
]
i∈1...K,j∈1...N
(5)
Essentially, DJM(X) is very similar to the gradient back-
propagated through a DNN during a training process. The
only difference is DJM(X) differentiates with respect to the
input features rather than network parameters. Since F (X) is
differentiable at a point yi on the surface mi, the ith row of the
DJM(X), denoted as DJMi(X), defines a linear transform
RN → R1, which is the best pointwise linear approximation
of the function F (X) near the point yi on the surface mi [19],
which can be mathematically represented as:
F (X + δx) = F (X) +DJM(X)× δx+ δe, (6)
where δe ∈ RK is the difference between original surfaces
and approximated surfaces.
B. Sensitivity Skewness Robustness Metric
Local neighborhoods on a output surface around different
surface points have different shapes, which results in different
inputs have different sensitivity to the same noise level .
In order to measure the sensitivity, we propose a novel
Noise Sensitivity Score (NSS) as an input-wise adversarial
robustness metric. The core of the proposed NSS is a novel
DJM based rate of change estimation. They are explained
from an insightful mathematical point of view in section III-B1
and III-B2 respectively. For a certain dataset, we are able to
measure the robustness of a DNN to the dataset under a fix-
directional attack based on the skewness of the obtained NSSs
distribution, which is illustrated in section III-B3.
1) Noise Sensitivity Score (NSS): Without loss of gener-
ality, let D(X) approximate a loss function of a classifier as
before. With an allowable maximum noise level µ, a successful
misclassification adversarial attack in this context is the added
noise δx ≤ µ disqualifies the Eq. (1), which gives:
min(yi) 6= yt i ∈ 1 . . .K. (7)
For an unsuccessful attack, the Eq. (1) still holds. Since the
current added noise δx is not able to deliver a successful
misclassification attack, a fix-directional attack increases the
noise level  up to the allowable maximum noise level µ
in order to deliver a successful misclassification attack. The
proposed NSS is able to reflect the noise sensitivity of a
specific input within a controlled enlarged noise level, which
is defined as:
NSS :=
yj − yt
st − sj (8)
s.t. argmin
j
(f(
yj − yt
st − sj )) j ∈ 1 . . .K, j 6= t,
where, f(x) =
{
C, x < 0
x, x > 0
where yj − yt is the gap needed to be covered in order to
misclassify the input to the jth class. Since we only consider
the correctly classified inputs, the value of yj − yt is always
positive. The si is the rate of change on yi dimension which is
driven by the added noise δx. The minus sign in the denomi-
nator is a bit tricky, which is because an ideal misclassification
attack should increase the target error value st and decrease
the error value of the potential misclassfied class sj , which
means the value of st − sj should be positive. However, the
st−sj could be a negative value in the following situations: (a)
st decreases and sj increases; (b) both of st and sj decrease,
but st decreases faster; (c) both of st and sj increase, but
sj increases faster. If any of the above cases happen to an
input, it means it is impossible for a fix-directional attack
to deliver an effective attack to the input. Then, the specific
input deserve a maximum score. This task is achieved by the
f(x) is used in the Eq. (8). The value of C defined in f(x)
is a constant positive value the so-called maximum score. In
section III-B3, we show that C could be any value larger than
the predefined skewness threshold. Intuitively, Eq. (8) can be
regarded as finding the minimum time to cover the distance
yj−yt with a speed st−sj . Therefore, the input with a smaller
NSS is more vulnerable to the enlarged noise, and vice versa.
A local neighborhood on an output surface mi is rarely
flat, especially for an enlarged local area resulted from an
increased noise level . This raises the difficulties to estimate
the rate of change in the level of desired accuracy. Therefore,
we propose to estimate the rate of change based on a novel
DJM based scheme, which takes the nonlinearity nature of
an output surface into account.
2) Estimating Rate of Change: The essential idea of the
proposed DJM based scheme is leveraging the aforemen-
tioned feature of DJM which states that DJM gives the
best pointwise linear approximation of a function in a small
local neighborhood around a point in a embedded space.
Specifically, if an added noise δx does not deliver a successful
attack, based on the Eq. (6), with a small extra shift δx′ in the
input domain, the approximated shifted position of a surface
point yni can be estimated as:
y′i ≈ F (X + δx) +DJMi(X + δx)× δx′. (9)
Therefore, the rate of change caused by the small shift δx′
can be estimated as:
si ≈ DJMi(X + δx)× δx
′
‖δx′‖ i ∈ 1 . . .K. (10)
It is worth to mention that, the δx in the above equation can be
of 0, which means an attack starts from the original input X
instead of X + δx. This feature gives the proposed NSS more
flexibility to be used. The validation results in section IV-C1
illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed NSS and the DJM
based rate-of-change estimation. However, since the DJM is
only an accurate linear approximation for a small δx′. The
approximate accuracy decreases while δx′ increases. This can
also be observed in our validation results. More details related
to the validation are provided in section IV-C1.
3) Skewness Based Dataset Robustness Metric: The pro-
posed NSS is an input-wise adversarial robustness estimator. In
order to understand the adversarial performance of a DNN on a
dataset, we need to obtain the NSSs for all correctly classified
inputs. Intuitively, if more inputs give smaller NSSs, it means
the DNN is less robust to the attack on the dataset, and
vice versa. This phenomenon can be quantitatively described
by the skewness of the obtained NSSs’ distribution. Due to
the perceptual constraint, with a controlled noise level, a fix-
directional attack is unable to successfully attack all the inputs
of a dataset. It means only the distribution of smaller NSSs
matters to the dataset robustness score. Thus, a NSS threshold
is introduced and the skewness is estimated only based on the
NSSs that are smaller than the defined threshold. Empirically,
the threshold is set to 5 for all our tested datasets. That also
explains the reason that the value of C defined in Eq. (8) can
be of any value larger than the NSS threshold. In other words,
the proposed robustness score is not sensitive to the value C.
We set C to 100 in our experiments in order to view the full
picture of the obtained NSSs’ distribution. To calculate the
skewness, a commonly used sample skewness [20] is adopted,
which is defined as:
γ =
√
n(n− 1)
n− 2
1
n
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)3
( 1n
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2) 32
, (11)
where xi is the sample with NSS larger than the predefined
threshold; x¯ is the mean of those samples; n is the number of
those samples.
IV. EVALUATION
Our evaluations are designed to demonstrate the effective-
ness and generalization of the proposed NSS and the skewness
based dataset adversarial robustness metric. To do that, we
apply the proposed metrics to different widely used state of the
art DNN models on four different well known classification
datasets, namely MNIST [21], CIFAR-10 [22], CIFAR-100
[22], and ImageNet [23]. Without loss of generality, two
widely known fix-directional attacks are used, which are Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and Fast Gradient Method
(FGM). In section IV-A, we first describe FGSM and FGM in
more details. Then, all the chosen datasets and corresponding
DNN models are described in section IV-B. In section IV-C,
the validation results are illustrated in terms of NSS and
skewness based dataset adversarial robustness.
A. Adversarial Crafting
The natural goal of an adversary is to craft adversarial
samples. As discussed in Section II-A, there are different
ways of formulating such adversarial samples. For validation
purpose, we mainly focus on fix-directional gradient attacks
where we adopt FGSM and FGM specifically. Eq. (4) gives
the mathematical definition of FGSM. Similarly, FGM is
mathematically defined as:
δx = ~VFGM = 
∂yt
∂X
. (12)
As we can see, the only difference between Eq. (4) (i.e.,
FGSM) and Eq. (12) (i.e., FGM) is that FGSM applies the
sign operator to the calculated gradient. The sign operator can
be regarded as a normalization process, which results in a more
perceptually plausible adversarial image. Theoretically, ~VFGM
gives the most effective direction to perform an adversarial
attack. However, the sign operator used in FGSM has changes
the most effective direction, which makes the FGSM is less
effective than FGM. Our extensive experiment results also
illustrate that FGM is a stronger attack as compared to FGSM.
B. Datasets and DNN Architectures
MNIST. Our initial experiments were performed on standard
MNIST dataset of handwritten digits. Each sample is a 28×28
binary pixel image. The complete dataset consists of 70k
images, divided into 60k training and 10k testing images.
For preprocessing, we normalize the data using mean and
standard deviation. Three different architectures are used on
this dataset, namely, LeNet [24] and two three-layer Multiple
Layer Perceptron(MLP). The only difference between the two
MLPs is the number of neurons in each layer is set differently.
One of them has 100 neurons in each layer, denoted by MLP1,
while the other one has 200 neurons in each layer, which
is denoted by MLP2. All three networks are trained with a
learning rate of η = 0.01 for 20 epochs by using Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SGD).
CIFAR. CIFAR dataset comprises of two sub-datasets,
namely, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Both the CIFAR datasets
consist of 32 × 32 RGB images. CIFAR-10 consists of 10
classes, and CIFAR-100 contains images drawn from 100
classes. Each of them contains 60k images, 50k training
images, and 10k testing images. Preprocessing was done to
normalize the data using channel means and standard devia-
tion. Additionally, a widely used data augmentation scheme
of mirroring and shifting are used for both CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100. For validation, VGG-13 [25], ResNet-18 [26]
and DenseNet-40-without-bottleneck [27] models are used
due to the following reasons: a) All of them are widely used
state of the art models, and b) They represent three different
mainstream architectures, namely sequential, skip-connected
and cross-connected. Therefore, the validations based on these
three networks demonstrates the generality of the proposed
metrics. CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 architectures are trained
for 300 epochs respectively. A non-uniform learning rate
scheme is used, where the initial learning rate is set to 0.1,
and is divided by 10 at 50% and 75% of the total number of
epochs.
ImageNet. ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Chal-
lenge (ILSVR) 2012 consisting of 1.2 million training images
and 50,000 validation images is used for our validation. With
the same motivation as CIFAR, four best performed pre-trained
models provided by PyTorch [4] are chosen for our validation
purpose, which are VGG-19 with batch normalization,
Inception-v3, ResNet-152, and DenseNet-161. All of the
mentioned networks expect the input images to be normalized
in mini-batches of 3-channel RGB images of shape
(3 × H ×W ), where H and W are expected to be at least
224. The images are loaded in the range of [0, 1] and then
normalized using a mean = [0.485, 0.456, 0.406] and std =
[0.229, 0.224, 0.225] [4].
C. Validation Results
It is important to substantiate both the effective and gen-
eralizable properties of the proposed metrics. The validation
experiments for explaining these properties were designed
accordingly.
1) Noise Sensitivity Score: As explained in section III-B3,
input samples with smaller NSS are more prone to be attacked
successfully with an increase in the noise level . Given the
maximum allowable noise level µ, the adversarial algorithm
finds the smallest  which perturbs the original sample in
order to mis-classify it. In order to validate correctness of
the exception, we design the following experiment. Firstly,
we apply FGSM/FGM to a dataset with an initial noise level,
which is set 0.05 for MNIST and 0.00117 (0.3/256) for
other three datasets. The estimated NSSs of all the correctly
classified inputs are recorded and indicated as blue color in the
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. It is worth to mention that the initial noise
level can be of any value larger than or equal to 0, and the
initial value does not impact the proposed metrics. The main
reason of not setting the noise level to zero is because we
want to show a DNN’s adversarial accuracy, obtained from
(a) MNIST-MLP1 (b) MNIST-MLP2 (c) MNIST-LeNet
(d) CIFAR10-DenseNet-40 w/o Bottleneck (e) CIFAR10-ResNet18 (f) CIFAR10-VGG13
(g) CIFAR100-DenseNet-40 w/o Bottleneck (h) CIFAR100-ResNet-18 (i) CIFAR100-VGG13
(j) IMAGENET-DenseNet-161 (k) IMAGENET-Inception-V3 (l) IMAGENET-ResNet-152 (m) IMAGENET-VGG-19-BN
(Orange): µ = {0.1, 0.00156} (Pink): µ = {0.15, 0.00195} (Purple): µ = {0.2, 0.00293} (Blue): µ = {0.05, 0.00117}
Fig. 2: Noise Effectiveness charts for FGSM attacks. Area under the blue color denotes NSS scores for the correctly classified samples for
the given noise level. Orange, pink, and purple colors denoted the NSS scores of the samples that were successfully attacked. Each color
denotes the noise level added to the dataset with respect to the corresponding attack, where in µ = {µ1, µ2}, µ1 is the noise level added to
MNSIT and µ2 is the noise level added to rest of the datasets.
the low noise level, is not an ideal adversarial robustness
metric. Besides less explainable, it does not always accurately
predict the performance of the DNN in the context of a higher
allowable noise level. Secondly, in order to show the consistent
performance of the proposed NSS, we increase the allowable
noise level to three different levels and record the NSSs
for those who are successfully attacked (i.e., misclassified).
The three different levels are 0.1, 0.15, 0.2 for MNIST and
0.00156(0.4/256), 0.00195(0.5/256), 0.00293(0.75/256) for
other three datasets, and the corresponding NSSs are marked
in orange, pink and purple Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 respectively.
The obtained NSSs from different DNN architectures across
different datasets under the FGSM and FGM are presented as
histogram charts and shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 respectively.
As we can see, for all the datasets and architectures, the
overlapping regions are always on the very left side of the
respective charts. In other words, all the charts show the inputs
with lower NSS are easier to be attacked successfully. One
can expect the mis-classification to increase with a higher
allowable noise level. This can also be observed from all the
figures in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, where the overlapping regions
are getting larger with an increase in the allowable noise
level. In addition, the above observations are consistent for
both FGSM and FGM. These results are all strong evidences
for the effectiveness and generalization of the proposed NSS.
More interestingly, based on the distribution of the obtained
NSSs, we are able to gain a relatively precise intuition about
different DNNs’ performance on a dataset. For example, based
on the Fig. 2d and Fig. 2e, it is obvious that ResNet-18 gives
a better adversarial performance than DenseNet-40-without-
bottleneck since the recorded NSSs of ResNet-18 spread in
a much wider range than the ones of DenseNet-40-without-
bottleneck. Following the same theory, based on the Fig. 2e
and Fig. 2h, we can predict the ResNet-18 is more robust on
CIFAR-10 than CIFAR-100. These two observations can be
confirmed by the corresponding adversarial error rates shown
(a) MNIST-MLP1-FGM (b) MNIST-MLP2-FGM (c) MNIST-LeNet-FGM
(d) CIFAR10-DenseNet-40 w/o Bottleneck (e) CIFAR10-ResNet18-FGM (f) CIFAR10-VGG13-FGM
(g) CIFAR100-DenseNet-40 w/o Bottleneck (h) CIFAR100-ResNet18-FGM (i) CIFAR100-VGG13
(j) IMAGENET-DenseNet-161 (k) IMAGENET-Inception-V3 (l) IMAGENET-ResNet-152 (m) IMAGENET-VGG-19-BN
(Orange): µ = {0.1, 0.00156} (Pink): µ = {0.15, 0.00195} (Purple): µ = {0.2, 0.00293} (Blue): µ = {0.05, 0.00117}
Fig. 3: Noise Effectiveness charts for FGM attacks. Area under the blue color denotes NSS scores for the correctly classified samples for
the given noise level. Orange, pink, and purple colors denoted the NSS scores of the samples that were successfully attacked. Each color
denotes the noise level added to the dataset with respect to the corresponding attack, where in µ = {µ1, µ2}, µ1 is the noise level added to
MNSIT and µ2 is the noise level added to rest of the datasets.
in Table I. The boundary between different color regions are
also worth to pay attention. As we can see, except for MLP1
and MLP2, the boundaries in all other charts of Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3 are all relatively vertical. However, we can see the
boundaries between purple and blue regions has shallower
steepness than other two boundaries in general, which implies
the NSS works more effectively with a lower allowable noise
level. It confirms the DJM ’s limitation as claimed in the
section III-B2.
2) NSS Skewness based Adversarial Robustness Metric:
We validate the proposed skewness based dataset robustness
metric by comparing the adversarial error rate for all the
architectures mentioned in section IV-B under both FGSM
and FGM attacks. The same experimental setup of validating
NSS is used. In Table I, we present an extensive set of results
of all the architectures mentioned in IV-B from all datasets.
It is to be noted that although the validation performance of
these architectures are very close to each other, the adversarial
performances varies a lot. This observation puts forward an
interesting question as to how differently an architecture learns
a dataset? Also, can adversarial accuracy be used as the metric
to evaluate that? We argue that the adversarial error rate is not
the ideal candidate for measuring robustness.
One interesting observation across all the results in the
table is that the skewness score is directly proportional to the
adversarial error rate. It is to be noted that the skewness scores
was calculated for the lowest noise level for each of the dataset,
but the values correlate with the architecture’s performance
at higher level noises. This characteristics is not true for
adversarial accuracies at lowest noise level. For instance, in
the CIFAR10-FGM case from Table I, VGG13 architecture
showed lower error rate at lower noise level as compared
to ResNet-18 but the trend flipped when we increased the
level of noise. Similar observations were witnessed in CIFAR-
100 FGM and FGSM results. These results substantiate the
prediction property of the skewness score. Additionally, we
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(c) CIFAR100-FGM
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(d) IMAGENET-FGM
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(e) MNIST-FGSM
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(f) CIFAR10-FGSM
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(g) CIFAR100-FGSM
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(h) IMAGENET-FGSM
: µ = {0.0, 0.0} : µ = {0.05, 0.00117} : µ = {0.1, 0.00156} :  = {0.15, 0.00195} : µ = {0.2, 0.00293} : Skewness score
Fig. 4: Skewness analysis for different architectures using both (a-d) Gradient Attacks and (e-h) Gradient Sign Attacks using a skewness
threshold of τ = 5. Each color denotes the noise level added to the dataset with respect to the corresponding attack, where in µ = {µ1, µ2},
µ1 is the noise level added to MNSIT and µ2 is the noise level added to rest of the datasets. The color bars represents the error rate of the
respective architecture at the given noise and the circled line denotes the skewness score of the respective architecture.
can clearly see the correlation of the skewness scores with the
error rates for across all architectures and datasets in Figure
4.
It is seen in Table I, that the skewness scores are not biased
to a certain dataset. It retains its unique property across all the
datasets. The skewness score is highest for the architecture
having highest error rate. Furthermore, it is surprising to
observe how easy it is to mislead a network trained on large
datasets like ImageNet. Another important observation, is to
note the difference in adversarial performance using FGM and
FGSM attacks. This difference is prominently seen from the
adversarial accuracies across all datasets. In general, we notice
that FGM is a more powerful attack when compared to FGSM.
TABLE I: In this table, we show the Validation (VA) error rate and
Adversarial (AD) error rate from different setups. The corresponding skewness
based dataset robustness scores are also shown in the last column.
Dataset Attacktype Models VA %
AD %
µ = 0.05
AD %
µ = 0.1
AD %
µ = 0.15
AD %
µ = 0.2
Skewness
score
MNIST
FGM
MLP1 2.61% 40.63% 66.79% 71.14% 72.06% 2.4747
MLP2 2.13% 28.62% 56.78% 61.71% 63.35% 1.9306
LeNet 0.77% 20.24% 37.74% 44.55% 48.30% 0.3923
FGSM
MLP1 2.61% 17.46% 49.40% 65.38% 70.48% 1.7377
MLP2 2.13% 12.11% 36.41% 54.58% 62.07% 1.6304
LeNet 0.77% 5.62% 20.60% 33.66% 45.41% 0.2072
CIFAR-10
FGM
DenseNet40 5.18% 27.64% 34.35% 39.90% 48.57% 1.9316
ResNet18 4.51% 18.52% 22.60% 26.72% 33.83% 0.8931
VGG13 5.90% 18.24% 23.03% 27.22% 36.45% 0.9726
FGSM
DenseNet40 5.18% 19.93% 25.97% 31.75% 43.46% 1.6575
ResNet18 4.51% 12.99% 16.35% 19.70% 26.98% 0.6567
VGG13 5.90% 13.26% 16.36% 19.41% 26.75% 0.6558
CIFAR-100
FGM
DenseNet40 24.22% 58.18% 65.21% 70.35% 78.88% 3.2808
ResNet18 21.24% 47.19% 52.59% 57.41% 65.49% 2.6733
VGG13 29.15% 47.84% 52.47% 56.70% 64.83% 2.5241
FGSM
DenseNet40 24.22% 49.66% 56.52% 62.53% 73.64% 3.6574
ResNet18 21.24% 40.82% 46.09% 50.75% 60.20% 2.7215
VGG13 29.15% 42.32% 46.44% 50.08% 57.62% 2.2655
IMAGENET
FGM
VGG19 bn 25.78% 86.83% 90.42% 92.31% 94.35% 1.2080
ResNet152 21.69% 66.62% 72.05% 75.81% 81.04% 0.5638
DenseNet161 22.86% 70.63% 76.07% 79.92% 85.23% 0.7149
InceptionV3 22.65% 64.40% 68.21% 70.57% 73.95% 0.3091
FGSM
VGG19 bn 25.78% 79.26% 85.42% 89.18% 93.52% 1.2047
ResNet152 21.69% 59.61% 66.41% 71.45% 79.21% 0.5428
DenseNet161 22.86% 64.80% 72.08% 77.30% 84.81% 0.7055
InceptionV3 22.65% 57.28% 61.83% 65.25% 70.58% 0.3371
V. DISCUSSION
We propose a new class of algorithms that can quantize
noise sensitivity of an input under a DNN fix-directional
adversarial attack. The proposed NSS and skewness based
dataset adversarial robustness metric are extensively tested
using popular DNN architectures and the results approve that
they work effectively and consistently across all the four state-
of-the-art datasets. Compared to previous works, our validation
experiments are much more thorough and convincing. Further-
more, an important characteristic of most of the previously
proposed robustness metrics is that they all work in the input
domain. This basically comes down to taking some form
of distance metrics in terms of L0, L2 or L∞ norm and
finding the distance between the original and the adversarial
images. We propose to measure the robustness score of a given
framework by getting the scores directly from the adversarial
architecture attack mathematical model. Although we focused
our work on the misclassification adversarial attack, the pro-
posed metrics are also applicable to targeted misclassification
attacks. To do that, we only need to change yt in Eq. (8) from
predicted class error to the targeted class error. In addition,
the proposed metrics are also suitable to non-gradient based
attack, such as Gaussian noise attack and uniform noise attack
[28].
The proposed metrics provide an insightful mathematical
point of view to look at a DNN’s dataset-wise robustness
under a fix-directional adversarial attack and quantizes the
predicted robustness. One of our key results is the absence
of an absolute robustness concept for a DNN since applying
the same DNN to different datasets may lead to significant
robustness gaps. Therefore, we argue that understanding a
specific sample’s robustness is more important than measuring
a DNN’s robustness to a specific dataset. The proposed NSS
is designed for this purpose. Interestingly, even without the
proposed skewness based dataset robustness metric, we can
already have an intuition about a DNN’s adversarial perfor-
mance on a dataset based on the plotted distribution of the
NSSs, such as the charts in Fig 2 and Fig 3. One limitation
of NSS is it may not accurately reflect the noise sensitivity
of a DNN’s input with a large allowable maximum noise
level. The larger allowable maximum noise level results in
a larger neighborhood on an embedded surface mi where
the DJM may not be able to provide a desired accuracy
level approximation. In other words, the nonlinearity of the
enlarged neighborhood may not be approximated accurately
with a single piecewise linear approximation. If that is the
case, a multi-step NSS approach can be used to solve the
problem. Instead of using the si defined in Eq. (10), we can
divide the targeted large noise level into multiple small noise
levels and apply Eq. (10) for each of them. Then, the final rate
of change is the average of the values estimated from those
small noise levels. However, due to the perceptual constraint,
the maximum allowable noise level cannot be significantly
large, especially for the FGM. Hence, it is uncommon to use
the proposed multi-step NSS.
Our future works will focus on extending the NSS to make
it work under an unfix-directional attack. Another interesting
direction to look into is leveraging the proposed NSS during
a training process in order to improve a DNN’s adversarial
performance.
VI. RELATED WORK
Behavior of machine learning algorithms, precisely deep
learning, in an adversarial environment is an active area of
research in the security community. Various adversarial attacks
have been devised by either directly using the respective
model details or by transferring the generated adversarial
samples from one model to another [3]. Over the years,
different techniques are developed for crafting adversarial
samples using the gradient procedure [1], [10]. These attacks
were discussed in detail in section II-A. On the other hand,
many attempts have been made at making DNN robust to
these adversarial attacks. Recent studies have focused on
detecting adversarial examples directly [29]–[31]. Moreover,
these techniques also require modifying the model or acquiring
sufficient adversarial examples, such as training new sub-
models [29], retraining a revised model as a detector using
known adversarial examples [30] or performing a statistical
test on a large group of adversarial and benign examples [31].
Some classical adversarial defenses are discussed in section
II-B but further details on different defense mechanisms falls
outside the scope of this paper.
With the development of different adversarial crafting and
defensive algorithms, there is a need to introduce a robustness
metric that measures the resiliency of machine learning algo-
rithms to adversarial perturbations. Many researchers consider
the adversarial accuracy of an algorithm as the measure for
evaluating robustness [6]. Also, different distance based norm
metrics using L0, L2 and L∞ are used for robustness analysis.
A detailed analysis of these robustness metrics is provided in
section II-C. In this paper, we proposed a skewness based
dataset robustness metric and validated the results in a cross-
framework and cross-dataset scenarios.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed the Noise Sensitivity Score (NSS)
which measures the sensitivity of different inputs to the same
noise level. The NSS together with the skewness based dataset
robustness metric aids in providing a resilient metric which
works for different fix-directional gradient attacks across vari-
ous architectures and datasets. We performed a comprehensive
set of experiments to substantiate the effectiveness of our
proposed metrics.
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